Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

Tim Roughgarden

2016 · Publication information not supplied2 Foruma page views

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DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781316779309Source snapshot: DOI publication recordView source

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Key issue: tie-breaking. When two bidders submit the same highest bid for a single item, which one receives it? Section 2.4 of the 2016 English edition defines the second-price auction on p. 13. Footnote 4 on p. 14 acknowledges ties when proving Proposition 2.1. Stating a tie-breaking rule alongside the auction definition would let readers determine the winner for every bid profile.

The first reply gives a tied-bid example, a suggested addition to the definition, and the equality case in the proof.

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